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THE LIMITS OF TEXTUALISM IN INTERPRETING THE 
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
 
STEPHANOS BIBAS* 
In evaluating textualism’s role in interpreting the Bill of 
Rights, this Essay will focus on the criminal procedure provi-
sions, which often get overlooked because they are not taught 
in most constitutional law courses, and primarily on the Con-
frontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. 
The argument here is two cheers for textualism. To interpret 
the Sixth Amendment, lawyers and judges have increasingly 
relied on textualism, as they should. Indeed, it should even be 
the principal method of interpretation. But the excesses that 
have turned textualism into the only method with all the an-
swers are somewhat troubling. This is an area in which we see 
disagreement among the Republican appointees on the Su-
preme Court, with Justice Scalia taking the most textualist, 
most pro-defendant position;1 Justice Kennedy, Chief Justice 
Roberts, and Justice Alito saying, “No, you’ve gone too far;”2 
and, oddly, Justice Thomas as one of two swing Justices in the 
area.3 All of this goes to show how little we get when we try to 
squeeze the last possible drops out of textualism. 
In the Sixth Amendment context, textualism helps judges 
and lawyers get away from raw policy analysis and guides 
their inquiry toward whether or not a defendant has confront-
ed a witness. We do, however, tend to confuse textualism with 
originalism, which has so many broad and ambiguous mean-
ings that it sometimes smuggles in the Framers’ subjective in-
                                                                                                                                         
 * Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. This Essay was 
adapted from remarks given at the Federalist Society’s National Lawyers Conven-
tion in Washington, D.C., on November 14, 2013. 
  1. See, e.g., Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1168–76  (2011) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 313 (2009). 
 2. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 330–57 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Bryant, 
131 S. Ct. 1150. 
 3. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 329–30 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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tent. We further confuse textualism with formalism, even 
though the text often does not direct us to a formalistic bright-
line rule, much as Justice Scalia sometimes might like it to. 
To illustrate this point, this Essay will start with the text of 
the Sixth Amendment. The relevant clause guarantees: “[T]he 
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him . . . .”4 For several decades, beginning with 
Ohio v. Roberts,5 the Supreme Court interpreted the clause as 
establishing only a preference for face-to-face confrontation. 
Because that preference was not absolute, courts developed 
multi-factor balancing tests for deciding whether evidence was 
reliable.6 Clearly, the text does not direct courts to balance any 
factors. One can understand Justice Scalia’s ire, because the 
Framers could not have anticipated that the Sixth Amendment 
would be interpreted as a mere preference that can be out-
weighed by any number of considerations.7 
Thus, in 2004, seven members of the Court swept that rule 
away in Crawford v. Washington8 and said: “No. The text says 
the defendant shall be confronted with the witnesses against 
him. That’s not a preference; that’s a rule.”9 Accordingly, judg-
es must look at what a witness is, at what confrontation means, 
and at the historical incidents against which this rule was de-
signed to guard. 
Note first that the text by itself does not provide the answer. It 
has to be supplemented with an originalist context. The text, 
read alone, could mean any one of three things. One plausible 
textualist reading is that a witness means only a person who ac-
tually testifies in court. This was the position of the great evi-
dence scholar John Henry Wigmore and of Justice John Marshall 
                                                                                                                                         
 4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 5. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 6. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63–65 (2004). 
 7. Cf. id. at 53–54. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See id. at 55–56 (“We do not read the historical sources to say that a prior op-
portunity to cross-examine was merely a sufficient, rather than a necessary, condi-
tion for admissibility of testimonial statements. They suggest that this require-
ment was dispositive, and not merely one of several ways to establish 
reliability.”). 
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Harlan, the younger.10 The Court in Crawford ultimately rejected 
this reading, however, but not because it fails to square with the 
text.11 Indeed, it may well be the strictest reading of the text, but 
it does not square with the historical backdrop against which the 
text was adopted—namely, a series of treason trials in the 16th 
and early 17th centuries. The most notable of these was the trial 
of Sir Walter Raleigh, in which he was prosecuted based on un-
sworn, out-of-court statements that were extracted with thumb 
screws and the rack.12 Raleigh insisted: “I’m being tried by the 
Spanish Inquisition. I want to bring this witness into court be-
cause he’ll recant,”13 but his request was denied and he was 
eventually put to death.14 His conviction was widely viewed as 
an injustice, and all contemporary discussions of the right of 
confrontation referred to this incident.15 
“Witness” could also be read in the colloquial sense, as a per-
son who sees the crime. “Eyewitness,” after all, is the most 
common lay understanding of the term “witness.” That read-
ing is more or less the position that the Chief Justice, as well as 
Justices Alito, Kennedy, and Breyer, have been taking in recent 
cases.16 Alternatively, “witness” could be read in the more 
technical legal sense of anybody whose statements are being 
used as evidence. But, under this understanding, must the 
statements be used to prove the truth of the matter asserted, 
effectively smuggling in hearsay law? Or is a witness anyone 
whose statements are used, period? Or must the statements be 
formalized, as Justice Thomas would require?17 The text does 
not answer those questions. 
                                                                                                                                         
 10. See id. at 42–43 (citing 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1397, at 104 (2d ed. 1923)); 
see also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 175 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); Dut-
ton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 95 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 11. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. 
 12. See id. at 44. 
 13. See id. For a transcript of Sir Raleigh’s trial, see 1 DAVID JARDINE, CRIMINAL 
TRIALS 400 (London, Charles Knight 1832). 
 14. See 541 U.S. at 44. 
 15. See id. 
 16. See, e.g., Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2723 (2011) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557  U.S. 305, 330 (2009) (Kennedy, 
J., dissenting). 
 17. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 329 (Thomas, J., concurring); Davis v. 
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 834 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). 
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Now, a lot of textualists will say that textualism is closely re-
lated to originalism. Professor Volokh is in good company. Jus-
tice Scalia takes that position,18 and I think most would agree 
that the text at a minimum has to ban travesties like the trial of 
Sir Walter Raleigh. It makes perfect sense to read the Confron-
tation Clause to ban the use of out-of-court interrogations that 
provide the key evidence against a defendant and function as 
substitutes for live fact-witness testimony. 
The problem, however, is that one cannot know what “wit-
ness” means from the text alone. So Justice Scalia has to use a 
maneuver. He turns the word “witness” into “testimony.”19 As 
a result, the past decade of Confrontation Clause cases have 
focused on whether particular statements are “testimonial.”20 
But “testimonial” does not show up in the text of the Sixth 
Amendment. In addition, the right to be confronted is explicitly 
in the text, but Justice Scalia has turned “confrontation” into 
“cross-examination.” It is not clear, however, that cross-
examination is either necessary or sufficient to satisfy the Sixth 
Amendment’s Confrontation requirement. In the paradigmatic 
Raleigh trial context, that is probably what it means. But courts 
can also apply this text to a set of concerns that were not pre-
sent in the eighteenth century. For instance, many contempo-
rary cases involve not only fact witnesses, but expert witnesses 
as well. Where an expert witness is involved, live, face-to-face 
cross-examination is less important than exposing the underly-
ing irregularities of scientific methods and challenging the rel-
evance of scientific evidence.21 
As a result, at least seven Justices have been in the majority 
in Crawford and Davis v. Washington, holding that a court can 
                                                                                                                                         
 18. See, e.g., Josh Blackman, The Second Amendment and Rocket Launchers, JOSH 
BLACKMAN’S BLOG, (Jul. 29, 2012), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2012/07/29/the-
second-amendment-and-rocket-launchers/, [http://perma.cc/P258-E9EH] (quoting 
Think Progress: Interview with Antonin Scalia (Fox News television broadcast Jul. 29, 
2012) (Scalia: “Originalism is a sort of sub-species of textualism.”)). See also gener-
ally Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United 
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF IN-
TERPRETATION 3 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
 19. See, e.g., Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (citation omitted) (“[The Confrontation 
Clause] applies to ‘witnesses’ against the accused—in other words, those who 
‘bear testimony.’”). 
 20. See., e.g., Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2710. 
 21. See generally Jennifer Mnookin & David Kaye, Confronting Science: Expert 
Evidence and the Confrontation Clause, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 99 (2013). 
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admit into evidence a 911 call (which is not “testimony” by a 
“witness”), but not out-of-court questioning of a domestic vio-
lence witness.22 That is all arguably faithful enough to the con-
text in which the Confrontation Clause arose. But then, when 
the Court tried to extend that logic to expert witnesses, it pro-
duced a series of very closely divided, fractured opinions—
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, Bullcoming v. New Mexico, and 
Williams v. Illinois—where bare majorities of the Court extend-
ed this framework to lab analysts and certificates.23 That rea-
soning, however, is not as convincing if one questions the link 
from “witness” to “testimony” or “testimonial.” 
Thus, my opinion differs from that of my colleague Professor 
Volokh. It is not always clear that there were preexisting legal 
concepts at the time the Constitution was ratified that the Fram-
ers meant to preserve, at least in the Sixth Amendment area. 
Maybe the legal context is clearer under the Second Amend-
ment. But with respect to the Sixth Amendment, though there 
may have been a settled rule for eyewitnesses or fact witnesses, 
there probably was not one for expert witnesses. That is why one 
sees the Court struggling to identify legal analogies. Is a lab ana-
lyst more like a copyist who certifies that he copied every word 
on the document correctly, or a custodian of records who certi-
fies that there was no record in the files? Neither of those analo-
gies is very close. When the analogy is close, it makes sense to 
use originalism to supplement textualism. But when there is not 
a close analogue and where the text is susceptible to several 
plausible readings, how does one get to the answer? 
Lest you think I am going squishy, no less an authority than 
Justice Thomas says that this clause’s interpretation has be-
come “disconnected from history and unnecessary to prevent 
abuse.”24 These vague, strained analogies have drifted pretty 
far from the Sir Walter Raleigh trial. 
It is not clear that there was a preexisting concept of what 
“confrontation” meant in a criminal trial that the Framers 
meant to freeze in amber. And, ironically, as much as the cases 
                                                                                                                                         
 22. Davis, 547 U.S. at 828, 832–34. 
 23. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012). See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 
310–11 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 (2006)) (Certificates that 
are “functionally identical to live, in-court testimony, doing ‘precisely what a wit-
ness does on direct examination’” are testimonial.). 
 24. Davis, 547 U.S. at 838 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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try to get away from modern hearsay law, they are freezing in 
place eighteenth-century hearsay law, which was fairly cryptic 
and very much in flux.25 It was a set of technical doctrines that 
were not widely known or understood. The People could not 
have meant to enshrine these technicalities when they enacted 
the Sixth Amendment. It is likely that they did mean to stop the 
Raleigh trial-type abuses, but they did not mean to enact every 
jot, tittle, and iota of eighteenth-century evidence law. 
So the final point here is: When history runs out, what are we 
going to do? Are we going to squint? Are we going to draw 
strained analogies, or are we going to say the text takes us this 
far, to this point, and then after this point, we have to look at 
how the common law has developed? Is this a right that is sub-
ject to having its contours refined somewhat over the years, 
even if the core of the right really does need to be frozen in the 
eighteenth century? I think it is appropriate to use textualism 
as a starting point, and in many cases it might wind up getting 
us an answer. But when we go beyond that, when we purport 
to use increasingly strained forms of textualism supplemented 
by originalism to supply all the answers, we may undercut tex-
tualism’s core meaning and respectability. 
 
                                                                                                                                         
 25. David Alan Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 46–55 
(2009). 
